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[1] Preliminary observations
Two prefatory remarks are necessary at the outset. One, there can be 
no valid discussion of the protocols of the incorporation of Ml-type 
prefigurations in the literary text without problematizing and sorting out 
the epistemological status of the “received” matériái, that is, of the 
“borrowed” constituent element. Indubitably, most of the epistemological 
nőise tends to be generated by uncertainties involving the conceptual 
instabilities pertaining to the difference-and-likeness polarity between 
texts.
To somé extent, let’s face it, these uncertainties are an admission of 
failure: despite spectacular advances in humán thought and speculation, 
we still find ourselves unable to pin down the precise extent to which the 
external and internál formai building blocks of two texts should overlap 
fór us to accept the components of comparison as “objectively” similar. 
Clearly, in inquiries of this natúré we cannot avoid looking at analogy as 
one possible mode of cognition. Indeed, intertextuality and its satellites 
(interdependence, interlink, influence, the ad infinitum “play of texts,” 
source, residue, etc.) and analogy (together with its satellites: 
resemblance, sameness, difference, anomaly, archetype, paradigm, etc.) 
are interrelated within the same cluster of networking. However, simply 
because analogical reasoning can be both “correct” and “incorrect” (likely 
to be tinged by conative impulses or the simple desire to find meaning 
that appears to be coherent or simply “satisfying”), in our search fór 
reliable interpretive options the question we ultimately have to ask is this: 
when can we accept analogical thinking as reliable? Pút differently, to
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what extent do cognitive operations based on analogy provide new, and 
preferably verifiable, knowledge? Contrariwise, we are involved in the 
same kind of game when focusing on the perception of difference. Indeed, 
it is ultimately legitimate to ask the question whether in borderline 
negotiations we can indeed separate analogical relationships from 
anomaly.
Although the above line of reasoning would certainly be convenient 
to pursue, as indeed it has been elsewhere, this is nőt what is going to be 
discussed in the present context. My discussion of “epistemological 
status,” therefore, will be considered in different, and apparently more 
peripheral, contexts. Status, in the given frame of reference, will include 
issues of authenticity, authority, authenticated version, meaning and 
interpretation, the problematic of the intelligibility of the Ml-type 
configuration in the mythical correlation, as well as choosing between 
variable Ml-type paradigmatic models, this last one focusing on what the 
ultimate prefiguration should be among rival versions.
The common denominator of these well-rehearsed points of entry is 
the concept of sense-making, at least in two basic functional 
ramifications: (1) in signifying the primordial generation of (obvious or 
latent) meaning; and (2) sense-making in the cognitive, every-day 
meaning of the cerebral appropriation of existing (even if dormant, 
because potential) relations, links, and significance. This is to show that 
in the final analysis I am talking here about signification versus 
comprehension. In sum, I see myth(Ml)-and/in-literature transactions as 
manifestations of a special order of communication: a kind of 
communicative relationship which is essentially intertextual and 
intergeneric in natúré. In order to avoid unnecessary mystification, it will 
alsó be necessary to remember the dual natúré of sense-making: the 
creation as opposed to the perception of meaning. Without these 
demarcations no interpretation can exist.
My second remark pertains to conceptual delimitations. Throughout 
the present text I will be using the concept of myth in a special sense: I 
will be talking about M l or Ml-type/coded myth. What is Ml-coded 
myth? In the present discussion Ml will mean paradigm-generating 
ancient myth; myth thus will mean here sacred narrative or a high- 
prestige equivalent.1 In this logic, throughout the discussion that follows,
The rationale behind the “high-prestige equivalent” altemative is that if we accept the 
extant text of, say, one of Euripides’ dramas as the ultimate source of the myth of Medeia,
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the Ml code will variably connote the archaic, the primitive, the sacred, 
the theomorphic, the traditional, the canonized, as well as the time- 
honored and time-embalmed phenomenon. From the vantage point of the 
present, Ml is thus a fundamentally premodern, if nőt preliterary, 
phenomenon: a treasured relic of man’s adolescence, a record of a 
particular kind of imaginative thought patterning generated at the 
dawning of humán speculation. Consequently, it is legitimate to conceive 
of Ml as “received/borrowed” matériái: received/borrowed as a 
contributory stream fór the benefit of—as well as against the background 
of— subsequent literary cultures. As such, it will connote the shared, the 
derivative, the “quoted,” the rule-governed, the paradigmatic, the 
archetypal, the foundational, the primordial. It leads to the shared 
structural forms of common experience, to the larger narrative Systems 
and archetypal forms—archetypal images, characters, and situations— 
constitutive of humán culture. Ml constitutes meaningful links with 
tradition and convention, thus—emphatically so, fór instance, in the 
modemist sensibility—with the notion of unchangeability, therefore of 
stability and order. Thus it should come as no surprise that in the 
modemist aesthetic sensibility Ml came to be radically upgraded as the 
ultimate target of a new quest fór a saving paradigm, fór a sort of higher 
discourse.
[2] “Why are we here?”
Ml is thus important fór the present as “memory,” as “relic,” and as 
“residue” in the sense that this configuration of cultural continuity, thus of 
the social consciousness, comprises and conveys what I call the O/s: the 
“Original Inquiries.” By these I mean questions, both existential and 
speculative, queries that no humán community can shun. These are 
questions about the oldest known responses to inquiries about existence 
(the whys and hows of mankind’s ontological roots), about the world and 
its parts, about mén, women, as well as about mén and women. I am 
talking of answers in response to inquiries pertaining to the basic humán 
predicament, most typically to the kind of questions summed up in the
why nőt accept a select group of plays by Shakespeare or The Brothers Karamazov, or 
Melville’s Moby-Dick, or dozens of further classic and classical texts as high-prestige 
artifacts of mythical ránk and magnitude? This is a substantial theoretical issue involving 
bordér negotiations of a special kind that will nőt be addressed here.
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title of a painting by Paul Gauguin: Doú venons-nous? Que sommes- 
nous? Oú allons-nous? The questions, as we well know, have multiplied 
through the ages, the answers have been purified and scientized, bút there 
is no escaping the awe that haunts the modem in the face of the original 
scrutiny. Indeed, this understanding of myth shows a close affinity with 
what transpired in the beginning, “in a primordial and non-temporal 
instant, a moment of sacred time” (Eliade, Images 57).
With these restrictions maintained, Ml should be seen as offering a 
perspective on myth that is very different from what its distant cousins 
have been called upon to serve: M2 and M3. M2, fór instance, is a self- 
justifying intellectual construct which represents an inquiry intő the 
ideologically attuned and the epistemologically suspect modem, the 
recent, the contemporaneous. It can appear in a large variety of guises, 
including propaganda, heroification, artistic schematism, stereotypy, 
iconography, political priorities and other ideological statements. Thus in 
the dilemma whether myths (or rather myths of a certain kind) are 
“interested” or “disinterested” formulations, M2-type thought patteming 
is clearly of the former type. M2 will be briefly referred to later in this 
discussion; M3, which in my system primarily denotes present-day 
responses to well-rehearsed and time-tested inquiries, will nőt be dealt 
with at all in the present discussion.
To sum, from the vantage point of literature, one of the main 
reasons fór the relevance of Ml lies in its paradigm-generating potential, 
its potential fór serving as a vast mátrix fór subsequent myth-using and 
myth-recycling applications, as well as fór its prefigurative and archetypal 
uses.
[3] Authenticity and Authority
In ascertaining the status of Ml-type configurations of different 
orders of magnitude, it is essential to take a close look at what we have on 
hand by way of borrowal and/or inheritance. Questions are alsó in order, 
and in this probing attempt the apparently simplest questions tend to be 
the most problematic. Thus: can we reconstruct what the myth says; or, 
more precisely, what an Ml-type myth says? In other words, can we 
reconstruct the original meaning of the prefiguration, that is, can we break 
the codel
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If by Ml-type myths we mean “primitive” traditional órai tales of 
unknown authorship, that is, unsophisticated and non-literary narratives 
that are told in non-literate cultures, repeated and developed by 
anonymous storytellers, the answer is bound to be less than tentative, if 
nőt negative, fór the simple reason that our knowledge of the early myths 
is vague and meagre. It would be unwise to disregard the implications of 
G. S. Kirk’s sobering observation that “[o]ur understanding of the 
constitution of these earlier [i.e., preliterary] myths must necessarily be 
defective, almost non-existent” (“Defining” 53). Or, as Mircea Eliade has 
remarked, “the mythology that Homer, Hesiod, and the tragic poets teli us 
about is the result of a selective process and represents an interpretation 
of an archaic subject which has at times become unintelligible” 
(“Definition” 3).2
Thus, if we want to meet the requirements of philological accuracy, 
we have to acknowledge that like ancient poetry, traditional myths, 
because they are nőt accessible (1) in their original form and (2) their 
immediate and particular cultural environment, cannot be interpreted 
reliably. Or, cannot in any pure and primitive sense, anyway. The 
explanation of certain features can only be approximated by means of 
comparative analyses of different myths and different versions. Evén 
then, precise correlations are impossible to establish that would link a 
given myth to a particular piacé and time, or to the humán conflict that 
may have given rise to it. And since most myths have been handed down 
to us through the filter of subsequent interpretations and reworkings, we 
have to content ourselves with a kind of conventional abstraction or a sort 
of “working-knowledge” version pieced together from compositions 
(frorn the pens of Homer, Hesiod, Hyginus, Stesichorus, Ovid, etc.) 
produced many centuries after the myths themselves had been born. In 
other words, there is no escaping the fact than in dealing with Ml we 
have no access to the original narratives: we are bound to deal with 
retellings, already “quoted” variants. Hesiod in his Theogonia (Theogony) 
and Homer in his epics—or the compilers of these works—were believers 
in tradition and transmitters of it, bút they probably allowed themselves
Eliade alsó claims that "[o]ur best chance of understanding the structure of mythical 
thought is to study cultures in which myth is a ‘living thing,’ constituting the very 
support of religious life—cultures in which myth, far from portraying fiction, expresses 
the supreme truth, since it speaks only of realities (3).
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somé freedom of interpretation or poetic expression. As Róbert Falus has 
argued, “it was nőt only Homer who drew upon the tradition of the 
singers of legends. The lyrical poets and playwrights of later centuries 
reworked the inherited myths and they competed in how növel and 
appealing variations on the traditional subjects they were capable of 
producing”(9).
The sobering fact is that the mythology of antiquity survived the 
ancient Greeks and Romans only in subsequent literary and other artistic 
renditions, i.e., in “quotations.” In this sense, nőne of the known forms of 
Greek and Román mythology has an existence other than the heavily 
mediated, quoted versions. The myth of Prometheus, fór instance, which is 
in fact the oldest Greek myth we know, survived from preliterary times in 
three texts: two epic versions by Hesiod and a tragedy from the pen of 
Aeschylus.3
Indeed, all modem texts recycling classical mythology quote quoted 
versions. Martin S. Day designates this quoted-recreated-mediated form 
intermediate myth, and by way of comment he observes:
Such myth is founded almost wholly upon archaic myth, bút 
intermediate myth is skillfully shaped by highly conscious writers in a 
literate éra. During the period in which intermediate myth is produced, 
the populace or the author or both still believe in the sacral natúré of the 
myth. Aeschylus seems a devout worshipper of almighty Zeus, and 
Lucián of Samosata appears as sceptical as Edward Gibbon or Thomas 
Henry Huxley. The accomplished Greco-Roman purveyors of myth 
ranged from the sturdy agriculturist Hesiod to the ultra-sophisticated 
urbanite Ovid, bút scholars agree that uniformly these ancient writers, 
even the pious Aeschylus, deemed myth a plastic substance that they 
were free to mold and interpret. (5)
W. Righter is even more speciftc on this point:
[A]ny attempt to attribute literal meaning to Greek myth will be shot 
through with ambiguity, fór the tales are so immersed in their own 
cultural context that any careful study of them shows their un-reliability 
as a source of intelligible models fór any kind of critical purpose. Far 
from containing any ready intelligibility they are remote, complex, 
mysterious and opaque. (80)
3 Prometheus Bound, which is the first part of a trilogy. Its sequel, Prometheus Unbound, exists 
only in fragments, and the concluding tragedy, Prometheus the Firebearer, is completely lost.
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Most often, therefore, what is borrowed by the modern writer can 
seldom be thematically “innocent,” that is, meaningful in its unadulterated, 
original purity. To quote Righter again,
“[M]any modem versions of the classical myth, say Antigoné or 
Theseus, are nőt exactly simplified models so much as a frame on which 
to construct an intense and immediate story, which uses its classical 
source more fór its narrative shape than fór any particular meaning the 
myth mightbe thought to have had” (42).
If, however, the received myth is nőt only abstracted, bút alsó vague 
and indeterminate, it is hardly likely that its symbolic language could be 
adequately translatable. In this case what we have in terms of 
prefiguration is a nonreferential symbolic pattern with a soft focus of 
meaning that inevitably produces a kind of problematic residue of sense- 
making that is difficult to control.4
[4] Paradoxes of the Opaque Text
Apparently paradoxical though it may appear, the relatíve lack of 
analyzability and familiarity—as well as the open-endedness—of the 
inherited formula are attributes that can be imaginatively exploited by 
writer and critic alike. Indeed, once the myth, denuded of its historical 
reality, stands nőt fór a concrete and single thing with precise 
delimitations bút fór a series of related possibilities, authorial 
expectations are likely to be fanciful, if nőt transcendentalizing, and the 
critical attitűdé to mythical meaning can often be arbitrary. The special 
alcove reserved fór myth among other forms of expressiveness— 
primarily imagery and symbolism—, the added dimensions of vagueness 
and suggestiveness deriving from the very notion of mystery and “depth,” 
the portentuous aura of the “mythic significance,” of the “deeper forces,” 
can easily lead to the assumption that myth, even when incorporated in 
subsequent literary (con)texts, is something apart and subject to special 
rules. It might be remarked parenthetically that mythological fiction, fór 
instance, has even been considered to occupy a special piacé in terms of 
the very act of, say, novel-reading. According to J. J. White, “we must
Fór the soft focus metaphor I am indebted to Philip Wheelwnght, especially as elaborated in 
his "The Archetypal Symbol." (cf. Perspectives in Literary Symbolism, 214-243.)
4
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read [this kind of literature] in a different way from works fór which no 
such classical analogy has been offered” (“Mythological” 75).
What has been outlined above can potentially, though nőt 
necessarily, lead to speculative vagaries of interpretation. By saying “nőt 
necessarily,” I simply mean that, remaining within the bounds of a kind of 
common-sense approach, one should be aware of the fact that in the 
continuity of literary history the intertextual dependence of literary works 
on the formai and thematic properties of their predecessors is inevitable. 
Literature, in a certain historical sense, has been dependent on the clichés 
of previous stages of expressiveness, and much of the success of 
subsequent writing has hinged upon new modes of refreshing the received 
convention. Or, to pút it in more elegant phrasing, the development of 
literature has been the result of a series of continuities and discontinuities 
within the dialectic of tradition and innovation, and there is no reason 
why myth, one of the oldest, thus specially valorized, elements of the 
humán heritage, should be excluded from this sequence.
It is alsó easy to realize that the individual sensibility, of writer or 
reader alike, may find a degree of rapport and can be touched emotionally 
by its confrontation with primitive and archaic presence, with something 
remote and alien, or even exotic. Indeed, the very sense of remoteness, the 
presentness of the pást, the culturally conditioned attribution of high 
seriousness and approval can be contributory to affective involvement, a 
recognition of importance, even a sense of imaginative liberation in the 
cultural consumer. In spite of the possible lack of familiarity. “The very 
unfamiliarity of a body of myth or legend may ... be exploited precisely 
because its distance seems imaginatively useful...” (Righter 30). Nőt to 
mention further subjective and subjectivizing factors, such as “receptive 
snobbery.”
Myth motifs as meaningful forms or symbols are abstract in the 
sense that they are relatively open, nőt elaborately controlled, are free 
from localizing restrictions or precise delimitations. It can often be 
precisely this built-in soft focus of connotative potentials that is likely to 
make them capable of eliciting a potential richness of imaginative 
extensions. There are, however, two aspects that should be borne in mind. 
One, myth fór the ancient world may have expressed a conflict, a 
contradiction, blind alleys, deadlocks and incomprehensible terrible 
forces. They were bőm out of conflict, social and priváté humán tensions. 
As Claude Mettra has noted, “the gods were bőm from the tears of 
mankind; mén invented myths to console themselves, fór the gods were
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all silence and opacity” (“Epilogue” 1231). In this special sense I would 
even risk the claim that at the time of their genesis what we regard today 
as sacred tale or traditional narrative (Ml) was simply M2: in their 
original meaning-context they must have been as distinct and localized— 
and ideologized—as modem myths.
As indicated earlier, however, the original literal meaning of most 
borrowed myths is extremely difficult, if nőt impossible, to reconstruct. 
Further, as Righter claims, “the modern writer chooses something which 
is inevitably in somé degree alien even if it forms a part of an accepted 
literary tradition” (41). Because of this apparent distance, slight as it may 
be, and no matter how organic the internál connection between myth and 
artifact, it is difficult to accept—as somé influential spokesmen of Anglo- 
American Modemism claimed—that myth alone could automatically 
function as a catalytic agent in creating the universality (or “order,” 
“shape,” “significance,” “tradition,” etc.) of a given work of art. Myth 
may be used in furthering this aim, bút nőt necessarily by mere presence 
or even by a kind of topic and comment relationship, bút by internál 
position and the particular aesthetic function it is called upon to serve. In 
the final analysis, it is reasonable to claim that the presence of myth in a 
work of art cannot possibly guarantee the quality of the artifact in 
advance.
In fact, the fallacy of the intrinsic value of mythic paradigm and 
archetype has contributed to producing a lót of clichéd works. As one 
critic has remarked, “there is a tendency to regard works using great 
symbols ipso facto as great literary works. Certainly Homer, Virgil, 
Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Blake, and Goethe are conspicuous fór their 
use of archetypes, bút so, unfortunately, are trashy lesser works, best 
sellers, third-rate movies, and comic books” (Friedman 315). Or, as 
Ruthven suggests, “archetypal images ... may pop up in a toothpaste 
advertisement as readily as in an epic poem” (77).
[5] The Intelligibility of Ml in Literature
The cultural situation of the author, any author fór that matter, may 
be substantially qualified by the decisions s/he is called upon to make 
whenever confronted with the issue of intelligibility. To generate prose, to 
write a book is to invoke the possibility of a reader. Ideally, the 
relationship of both novelist and reader to myth is tacitly assumed to be
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one of familiarity. However, one does nőt even have to consult school 
curricula to come to the realization that the expectations of intelligibility 
of received Ml matériái are just nőt valid. G. Steiner was undoubtedly 
right in claiming in the 1960s that “the world of classical mythology, of 
historical reference, of scriptural allusion, on which a preponderant part of 
European and English poetry is built ... is receding from our natural 
reach” {Language 81). It would seem that prefigurative techniques fór this 
reason should be foredoomed to failure because [1] if the incorporated 
matériái is nőt understood, it cannot convey the weight of evocation, and 
[2] normally it has nőt been the aim of literature as a communicative art 
to deliberately rub the reader’s nőse intő their own ignorance. 
Paradoxically, however, the very obscurity of a body of myth (consider 
much of the myth matériái used by Yeats or by the numerous Native 
American and Chicano authors emerging fór over three decades in formai 
American prose) may be exploited precisely because its distance seems 
imaginatively useful. The obscurity of myth may be functional in 
literature, since myth can draw its strength from its very unanalyzability.
The potential lack of understanding may alsó have the opposite 
effect fór subjective reasons. It is at this point that the cult of the merely 
curious and the awe-inspiring has a role to play, nőt to forget about what I 
labeled above as “receptive snobbery.” Once myth has established itself 
as the in-thing to go in fór, it is nőt bound to lose its appeal even if the 
built-in meaning is lost on the recipient. To offer an analogous example, 
even he who has never heard a symphony in his life will agree that 
Beethoven was a great composer. Of symphonies.
The problem with a large proportion of myth critical writing is that 
the correlations established between an aspect of plot or character and its 
actual or assumed mythical prefiguration are often made to move out of 
what the literary example demands. The forcing of the mythical 
dimensions, the “do you see it?” aspect of clue-hunting, the uncanny 
reverence in which the presence of the ingeniously unearthed 
resemblances is held has produced so much loose tissue of "obliquely" 
and “elliptically” meaningful allusions and suggestions that one cannot 
help feeling the finder often becomes his own creator.
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Our test case will be the above-mentioned myth of Medea, a 
favorité and oft-rehearsed prefigurative dramatic narrative fór subsequent 
recycling transactions. The abstracted summary of the story-of-mad- 
revenge paradigm (formulated somewhat in the spirit of Stith Thompson’s 
motif-index) would sound something like this: murderous mother gets 
even with the father of her son(s) when he abandons her fór the sake of 
another woman. Within the European frame of reference, the most 
influential and memorable objectification of this tragic pattem is a drama 
first produced in 431 B.C.: Medea by Euripides. This ancient text in tűm 
has spawned a large number of more recent incamations in such diverse 
areas as literature (L. A. Seneca, P. Corneille, F. Grillparzer, J. Anouilh, 
etc.), music (e.g. L. Cherubini), the fine árts (from Delacroix to 
Veronese), the cinema (above all Pasolini’s famous film [1969] with 
Maria Callas acting in the role of Medea), alsó including numerous more 
recent adaptations such as one of the dozen or so Chicano dramas by 
Mexican and Chicano authors. A brief look at a one-act play by Chicano 
playwright Carlos Morton (1945-) will shed somé light on the precarious 
status of the Ml-type text as a fathering/implicating source.
The setting of Morton’s LaMalinche (1983) is part of Mesoamerica 
which subsequently became Mexico.5 The plot begins with a scene of 
preparation: in the ruined Aztec Capital of Tenochtitlán—today’s Mexico 
City—the Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés is getting ready fór his 
second wedding. His chosen mate this time is Catalina, daughter of the 
Spanish viceroy. La Malinche, who still lövés the conquistador, feels that 
she has been betrayed and taken advantage of. In her ragé, to get even,
[6] Which Version of the Prefiguration is “Authentic”?
5 Like the Virgen de/Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe, the golden eagle in the national flag 
of Mexico, the grandiose murai paintings of Diego Rivera (as well as of J. C. Orozco 
and D. A. Siqueros), tequila, Frida Kahlo’s world-famous canvases, the feared and 
venerated volcano by the name of Popocatépetl, the sweeping popular music known as 
mariachi, the indigenous woman of the early 15th century who came to be known as 
La Malinche is one of the unmistakable iconic signifiers of Mexico. Despite the fact, I 
should add, that the very mention of her name has elicited both praise and denigrating 
overtones. Her contradictory, if indelible, role in the early history of Mexico, 
particularly in the war of conquest led by the conquistador Hernán Cortés against the 
Aztec Empire is fittingly illustrated by these words: “el personaje ausente presente”: 
someone who is both there and here, equally in the distant pást and the accessible 
present.
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she schemes a cruel revenge. She joins forces with two prehispanic 
women, Cihuacoatl and La Llorona: the names of both women are 
associated with the rape and murder of children as well as with transitions 
between life and death. La Malinche schemes to pretend that she will 
accept the Spaniard’s betrayal dispassionately as an inevitable fact and 
outwardly she acts as if she accepted the imminent marriage as 
unavoidable. Surreptitiously, however, she concocts a plán of action in 
which Catalina is to meet her violent death on the day of the wedding. La 
Malinche prepares two gifts fór the would-be bride: a golden headdress 
and a gownlike omamental dress. These she douses with poison and she 
orders the young boy Martin—Cortés and Malinche’s own són—to 
deliver the wedding gifts to the conquistador’s fiancée. When Catalina 
opens the present delivered, she is dazzled by the glittering dress and the 
splendid quetzal-feathered headpiece. She tries them on and she 
immediately senses the hidden poison’s impact. She screams as her body 
burns and disintegrates. Expecting help from her uncle, Bishop Lizárraga, 
she holds on to him who thus alsó falls victim to the cruel revenge. 
Infuriated, Cortés goes to find Malinche so as to kill his one-time 
interpreter, confidante and lover. He soon locates her and finds that the 
woman is mouming: she is keeping vigil over the inért body of their dead 
són. As hinted by Martín’s own mother, the young mestizo child has been 
killed by La Llorona—with the conquistador’s own sword.
CORTÉS: It wasn’t I who síit his throat.
MALINCHE: It was yourblade, forged in Spain.
CORTÉS: He died because you did nőt want him raised a Spaniard?
MALINCHE: He died because you would nőt allow him to be raised a
Mechica.
CORTÉS: Give me his little body so that I may bury him in a Christian
way.
MALINCHE: No, you used your religion to deceive us.
CORTÉS: Have mercy on his sóul!
MALINCHE: We will cleanse him in the laké, where Tlaloc reigns. (55)
Malinche and Cortés blame each other fór Martín’s death, and the 
tragic scenes end with mutual vituperation and curses flying both ways.
It is unlikely that to a spectator/reader with a European cultural 
frame of reference the above plot—the shape of the story—should be 
unfamiliar. Indeed, as the story of the jilted/abandoned, jealous and 
revengeful woman is unfolding, the direction of the plot tends to become 
increasingly more predictable: the events of the play, segment by
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segment, come to be dictated and guided by the plot segments of another 
text embedded in the European literary culture centuries earlier. Morton’s 
text is clearly determined (if nőt overdetermined), and it is nőt necessarily 
an archetypal plot model inherited through the Jungian unconscious that 
we should have in mind when we look at it bút a much earlier 
objectification of the story dating back to the fifth century B.C., of which 
the foundational pattern is Medea. Foundational, that is, in the sense that 
each and every subsequent recycling of the theme will, by necessity, 
return to the play performed in 431 B.C., even if—Trencsényi-Waldaffel 
claims—“it consciously challenges it either in its motif-structure or 
solution” (xxxvii).
It would be a waste of time and effort to devote critical ink to 
considerations of the possibility or justifiability of the comparison of the 
two dramas: the Euripidesian tragedy versus Carlos Morton’s Chicano 
text. As a critic of John Steinbeck’s pút it almost three decades ago when 
this critic commented on the Nobel-awardee’s prefigurative technique 
through which ancient myth was incorporated in modern texts, that the 
oscillation between the two levels was “blindingly obvious” (Davis 4).6 
We could say the same thing about Morton’s myth-and/in-literature 
transactions: the Chicano version (the Cortés-Malinche paradigm) is 
clearly prompted by the Greek Jason-Medea model, etc.
However, this is nőt really the issue here. What is crucial to 
consider in this particular instance is whether the Greek playwright’s 
version established a normative recycling mode in the literary culture; 
“normative” in the sense that Euripides’s plot would be generally 
accepted as—with the later versions echoing—the exemplary myth of 
Medea. The drama version of the plot—which thus is alsó a torso 
version—concludes with Medea killing the two sons and she escapes 
Jason’s wrath in a sky-bome chariot drawn by dragons. Her fate seems to
6 This “blindingly obvious” aspect is further underscored by the sheer historical and 
demographic factuality of Latin American reality. The “sensation of orphanhood” that 
Fuentes is talking about, the need fór a sense of parenthood, a father and a mother, 
became a permanent fixture of post-Columbian Spanish American existence. “Most 
mestizos,” Fuentes explains, “did nőt know their fathers. They knew only their Indián 
mothers, the common-law wives of the Spanish. Miscegenation was certainly the rule 
in the Ibérián colonies...” (144). In addition, the contrast between the Christian 
conquistador of the European Renaissance versus the “barbaric Indián” woman of 
Nueva Espana offered effective ideological support fór philandering behavior without 
the least consideration of the morál consequences of “practical amalgamation.”
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be sealed, her luck is running out, and her subsequent life appears to be 
conforming to a downward spirál. In terms of the logic of dramatical plot 
construction this is a creditable and satisfying conclusion, and Euripides 
orchestrates the termination of the sequence of revolting scenes with great 
mastery.
However, if we look at the “unabridged” myth of Medea, which 
actually would be the untold sequel of the Euripides story, we find that 
Medea’s fate is far from being linked to an unpromising alternative; 
indeed her life is off to a fresh start, full of promises and surprising happy 
endings. In the larger myth of Medea, although she has to suffer the 
consequences of her conspiratorial disposition (she unsuccessfully plots 
the death of Theseus), Jason’s former enchanting sorceress mistress finds 
a father (King Aegeus of Athens) to her new són (whom she makes the 
king of Colchis), becomes a famous woman warrior and the founding 
mother of the Medes, a people living in Media, south-west Asia. An 
action-filled life, no doubt. However, the dilemma is nőt dispelled: which 
version of the Medea myth should be accepted as genuine and authentic? 
In one of these Medea rises and falls. In the other one she ultimately 
triumphs, against formidable odds. Which is a substantial difference.
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